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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 This employee-overtime appeal raises questions as to 
the nature of the evidence that is sufficient to create a jury 
question on the purported “willfulness” of an employer’s non-
payment of overtime.  The question matters because a finding 
of willfulness expands the limitations period for claims under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), in effect permitting a 
plaintiff to receive a larger award.  Here only the willfulness 
question was contested—Appellee Lackawanna County 
conceded the basic overtime violations—and at trial 
Appellants Michael Souryavong and Nelson Rolon presented 
some evidence on the question but not enough to avoid a 
directed verdict in the County’s favor.  We find no error in the 
District Court’s decision because the evidence presented did 
not suggest the County was subjectively aware of the FLSA 
problem at the time of the violations, at least with respect to 
Souryavong and Rolon.  Additionally, Souryavong and Rolon 
challenge the District Court’s calculation of attorney’s fees, but 
we find that decision appropriate as well.  We will affirm.  
I. 
 Souryavong and Rolon were among a class of 
individuals working in two separate part-time capacities for 
Lackawanna County.  The County apparently tracked and paid 
these employees for each of their individual jobs, but in 2011 
the County became aware that it had failed to aggregate the 
hours in both jobs, resulting in a failure to pay the overtime rate 
for hours beyond 40 hours per pay period. 
 In June 2013, Souryavong, Rolon, and Edwin Velez 
filed complaints in the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
alleging several claims, including the only one relevant here, a 
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claim against Lackawanna County for non-payment of 
overtime in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  By 
2015, it was undisputed that the County had violated the 
FLSA’s overtime provisions at various times from 2008 to 
2012.  Still disputed, however, was whether the County’s 
violation was “willful.”   
 In November 2015, the case went to trial on the 
willfulness question and damages.  At trial the employees 
presented evidence that included (1) documents showing the 
County’s failure to pay proper overtime, a failure that 
apparently lasted into January 2012 for Velez; (2) testimony 
from County Chief Financial Officer Thomas Durkin stating 
that “from 2007 onward” the County was generally “aware” of 
its obligations under the FLSA (App. 266); (3) testimony from 
County Human Resources Director Nancy Pearson stating that 
she was also generally aware of the FLSA and its requirements; 
and (4) a March 28, 2011 email from Pearson, sent to two other 
county officials, with the subject line reading “County wage 
and hour issues,” and the body of the email discussing certain 
county employees who were working “second jobs.”  (App. 
152.)  Pearson’s email highlighted two employees, one of 
whom was Edwin Velez, as examples of the issue, and she 
noted how these employees had each worked more than 40 
hours per week by serving the County in two part-time 
capacities:  “Velez works 50 plus hours a [two-week] pay 
period for the booking center and up to sixty hours a pay period 
for the sheriff’s department.  This sampling is not infrequent, 
irregular or scattered.”  (App. 152.)  The email concluded by 
raising the prospect that these employees might file labor 
grievances: 
[A]ll employees who work for the County should 
only be working in one position.  That brings us 
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to the next point on dealing with those 
individuals who may file a grievance for back 
pay for overtime for being paid straight time.  
Who would you like involved in a further 
conversation about this matter so this can be 
resolved? 
(App. 152 (emphasis added).) 
 At the close of the employees’ case, the County made 
an oral motion for entry of judgment as a matter of law, arguing 
the employees’ evidence was insufficient to create a jury 
question on willfulness.  The Court immediately held oral 
argument on the motion, and the employees’ Attorney Cynthia 
Pollick argued that their evidence was sufficient.  In support, 
she cited (1) “testimony from Nancy Pearson” and (2) “the fact 
that [the County] did not correct” the overtime issue over the 
course of “four years” of violations.  (App. 9-10.)  At the close 
of argument, the District Judge ruled from the bench.  He stated 
the employees’ evidence did not “measure up,” and granted the 
County’s motion and entered judgment in its favor on the 
willfulness question.  (App. 21.)   
 The damages question still remained, the case went to 
the jury, and it awarded $5,588.30.  The Court then addressed 
several post-trial motions, two of which are relevant here.  
First, the plaintiffs moved for liquidated damages under 29 
U.S.C. § 216.1  The County opposed the motion and argued 
                                              
 1  The effect of a liquidated damages award is to double 
the unpaid overtime compensation.  In this regard, 29 U.S.C. § 
216 provides that  “[a]ny employer who violates the provisions 
of section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or 
employees affected in the amount of their . . . unpaid overtime 
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liquidated damages were inappropriate because the County had 
operated in “good faith” and its FLSA violations were 
inadvertent.  See 29 U.S.C. § 260 (stating liquidated damages 
shall not be awarded if an employer operated in “good faith” 
and “had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or 
omission was not a violation of the [FLSA]”).  The employees 
disagreed, and argued the County’s violation was 
“intentional.”  (App. 83.)  The Court sided with the employees 
and granted the motion, but rather than grounding its ruling on 
“intentionality,” as the employees had argued that it should, the 
court reasoned in its memorandum opinion that the County had 
presented “no evidence” to show that it had taken any 
“affirmative steps to ascertain the FLSA’s requirements” prior 
to the at-issue overtime violations, or that the County had 
“acted in ‘good faith.’”  (App. 84.)  In support of this 
determination, the District Court correctly followed Martin v. 
Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 910 (3d Cir. 1991), in 
which we held that an employer’s failure to take “affirmative 
steps to ascertain the legality of its pay practices” mandates an 
award of liquidated damages. 
    In another motion, the employees moved for 
attorney’s fees and costs, requesting an award of $166,162.50.  
They based their request on a fee rate for Attorney Pollick’s 
work of $400 per hour, 367.6 hours of legal work, and 
additional legal-assistant time and costs.  The Court found the 
proper rate for Attorney Pollick to be significantly lower—
$250 per hour—and that only 278.2 hours were compensable, 
for a lodestar of $69,550.00.  It then deviated downward from 
                                              
compensation . . . and in an additional equal amount as 
liquidated damages.” 
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the lodestar to a final award of $55,852.85—approximately 
one-third of what the employees initially requested—after an 
analysis of the factors laid out in Hensley v. Eckart, 461 U.S. 
424, 430 n.3, 434-37 (1983).  The court recorded its analysis 
in a meticulous and thorough opinion. 
 This appeal followed, with Souryavong and Rolon 
filing a joint notice of appeal.  Velez—Souryavong and 
Rolon’s co-plaintiff in the District Court—did not join 
Souryavong and Rolon’s notice of appeal and did not file his 
own.  Velez is therefore not a party to this appeal.2   
II. 
 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
III. 
 Souryavong and Rolon’s appeal presents two issues:  
(1) whether the District Court was right to grant judgment as a 
matter of law on the willfulness question; and (2) whether the 
Court erred in its calculation of attorney’s fees. 
                                              
 2 The Lackawanna County Sheriffs Association was 
dismissed from the appeal after they and the employees 
resolved the employees’ claims through successful mediation. 
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A. 
 On the issue of whether the District Court should have 
entered judgment as a matter of law on the FLSA “willfulness” 
question, we apply de novo review.  Brownstein v. Lindsay, 
742 F.3d 55, 63 (3d Cir. 2014).  Although willfulness is a 
“question of fact,” Bianchi Trison Corp. v. Chao, 409 F.3d 
196, 208 (3d Cir. 2005), a district court may take the question 
from the jury and grant a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a 
matter of law if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis 
for a reasonable jury to find for” the non-moving party, Rego 
v. ARC Water Treatment Co., 181 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 Under the FLSA, whether an employer “willfully” 
violates the statute is of import because such a finding extends 
the FLSA’s limitations period from two years to three, bringing 
another year of lost pay within the scope of the worker’s claim.  
29 U.S.C. § 255(a).  The Supreme Court defines “willfulness” 
to include situations when the employer, at the time of its 
FLSA violation, either “knew” its conduct was prohibited by 
the FLSA or “showed reckless disregard for the matter.”  
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988).  
Acting only “unreasonably” is insufficient—some degree of 
actual awareness is necessary.  Id. at 135 n.13. 
 Here, no pre-violation awareness of the two-job-FLSA 
problem was shown by the evidence that Souryavong and 
Rolon presented at trial.  They argue otherwise based on:  a 
series of overtime violations that continued into January 2012 
with respect to Velez; Nancy Pearson’s raising of the overtime 
issue with other County employees in her March 28, 2011 
email; and the County’s general awareness of the FLSA’s 
requirements at all relevant times, as indicated by Durkin’s 
testimony.  But these three bits of evidence do nothing to show 
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that the County was (i) specifically aware of the two-job FLSA 
overtime problem (ii) as it related to Souryavong and Rolon 
(iii) prior to the dates of the violations.  Durkin’s testimony, for 
example, is insufficient because it does not get at the two-job 
problem—he only testified to an awareness of the FLSA on a 
basic level.  Willful FLSA violations require a more specific 
awareness of the legal issue.  See Flores v. City of San Gabriel, 
824 F.3d 890, 896, 905-07 (9th Cir. 2016) (identifying a jury 
question on FLSA “willfulness” where a city misclassified 
employee pay for nine years despite familiarity with the type 
of problem), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2117 (2017).  Also, 
Pearson’s testimony and the timing of Velez’s overtime 
violations do not show the necessary order of events for a 
willfulness finding as to Souryavong and Rolon.  Although 
Velez’s overtime violations post-date Pearson’s email, 
supporting an argument that the County’s violations as to him 
were willful, the same is not true for Souryavong and Rolon, 
who are the only parties for whom we may order relief because 
they are the only appellants.  For them, the parties have 
highlighted no evidence suggesting the County’s violations 
with their pay continued after Pearson’s email was sent.   
 Alternatively, even if Pearson’s email pre-dates some of 
the County’s FLSA violations as to Souryavong and Rolon, 
two other factors still indicate the District Court’s ruling is 
correct.  First, decisions from our sister circuits indicate that an 
FLSA violation must have a degree of egregiousness that is 
lacking in Lackawanna County’s case.  For example, a jury 
question on willfulness is present when a city is well aware of 
the FLSA’s strictures, sets up a bureaucracy to classify pay and 
benefits and properly calculate overtime, and then despite all 
that allows a misclassification of a monthly payment to 
continue for nine years.  Id.  Similarly, there is a jury question 
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on willfulness if a family fails to pay a nanny a minimum wage, 
family testimony indicates the family “knew” about minimum 
wage laws, and the nanny’s testimony was that the family 
required her to work twice as many hours as the family 
claimed, did not provide a contract or record her working 
hours, and instructed her to lie about her employment.  Davila 
v. Menendez, 717 F.3d 1179, 1182-83, 1185 (11th Cir. 2013).  
Here, nothing indicates Lackawanna County’s violation could 
be attributed to any similar level of recklessness or ill will.  The 
County apparently addressed the two-job FLSA problem 
within a year of the date of Pearson’s email—much sooner than 
the nine years in Flores—and while the County’s bureaucratic 
failure that caused the time-tracking snafu is perhaps an 
example of government morass, the evidence shows nothing 
akin to the manipulation and concealment found in the facts of 
Davila. 
 Second, even if Pearson’s email shows the County was 
aware of an overtime problem generally at the time of the 
Souryavong and Rolon violations, it does not indicate an 
awareness of an FLSA overtime problem specifically.  A 
plaintiff must put forward at least some evidence of the 
employer’s awareness of a violation of the FLSA overtime 
mandate.  See Flores, 824 F.3d at 907 (Owens, J., concurring) 
(emphasizing that Supreme Court “willfulness” precedents 
require a showing of some degree of subjective actual 
awareness of an FLSA violation and that mere negligence will 
not do).  Here, Pearson’s email only references “wage and hour 
issues,” and never mentions the FLSA or any other law—state 
or federal.  Pearson’s statement that the County’s conduct gave 
rise to the risk that an employee “may file a grievance for 
backpay for overtime” does not belie an awareness of an FLSA 
problem.  Without something connecting the email to the 
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FLSA, Pearson’s email is not enough on its own to create a jury 
question as to FLSA willfulness.  See Oakes v. Pennsylvania, 
871 F. Supp. 797, 801 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (finding no jury 
question on the willfulness of a meal-break FLSA violation in 
spite of employees previously raising a similar meal-break 
issue, because the previous issue was raised only in the context 
of a collective-bargaining agreement). 
 Finally, Souryavong and Rolon argue the District 
Court’s holding on liquidated damages somehow requires us to 
hold in their favor on willfulness.  Their argument is that the 
District Court recognized that the County acted “intentionally” 
when it ruled in the employees’ favor on the liquidated-
damages motion.  (Appellants’ Br. at 9.)  But the District Court 
grounded its ruling in a lack of evidence going to the County’s 
good faith attempts at FLSA compliance.  A lack of evidence 
going to good faith is not the same as evidence in support of 
intentionality.   
 In sum, the District Court was correct:  the evidence 
presented at trial did not measure up, and judgment as a matter 
of law was appropriate. 
B. 
 The second issue in this case is the award of attorney’s 
fees.  We review the “reasonableness” of a district court’s 
award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion, Smith v. 
Borough of Dunmore, 633 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 2011), but 
exercise plenary review over its selection of legal standards for 
determination of a fee award, Washington v. Phila. Cty. Court 
of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (3d Cir. 1996).   
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 Attorney Pollick makes three arguments that her fee 
award should have been higher.  Her first argument as we 
understand it is that the District Court erred as a matter of law 
in reducing the fee award below the lodestar amount.  
Specifically, she argues that use of the Johnson factors was 
prohibited by Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542 (2010).  We 
disagree.   
 Decades ago, courts calculated attorneys’ fees in 
divergent ways, with some relying exclusively on twelve 
factors laid out in the seminal Fifth Circuit decision, Johnson 
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 
1974), and others applying the lodestar method pioneered by 
this Court in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 
(3d Cir. 1973).  In 1983 the Johnson factors were given a boost 
when the Supreme Court explicitly stated in Hensley that 
district courts “may consider” the Johnson factors.  461 U.S. at 
434 n.9 (1983).  Among those factors listed by the Court was 
“the amount involved and the results obtained.”  Id. at 430 n.3 
(citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19).   
 Eventually, however, our lodestar approach “achieved 
dominance,” and in the 2010 case Perdue v. Kenny A. the 
Supreme Court spoke glowingly of the lodestar approach and 
its advantages as compared to the Johnson factors.  559 U.S. at 
551 (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 801 (2002)).  
The Court observed that the lodestar method has “several 
important virtues,” most specifically that “the lodestar method 
is readily administrable” and, “unlike the Johnson approach,” 
is objective in that it “cabins the discretion of trial judges, 
permits meaningful judicial review, and produces reasonably 
predictable results.”  Id. at 551-52.  
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 Yet the Court in Perdue still left room for Johnson 
factors to play a role in the attorney fee award decision:  First, 
a district court should calculate the lodestar—“the number of 
hours worked multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate”—which 
carries a “strong presumption” of “reasonable[ness]” and 
“includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a 
‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee.”  Id. at 543-44, 546, 552.  After 
calculating the lodestar, the court may deviate from it, but only 
in the “rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not 
adequately take into account a factor that may properly be 
considered in determining a reasonable fee.”  Id. at 543-44 
(emphasis added).  Thus, the consideration of Johnson 
“factors” is permissible on the back end of a lodestar’s 
calculation, as long as they are not already “subsumed in the 
lodestar calculation.”  Id. at 553.    
 Here, the District Court followed the proper lodestar-
then-Johnson factors process almost to a “T”:  it calculated the 
lodestar, identified the Johnson factors it thought not subsumed 
in the lodestar, analyzed those factors in light of the facts of 
this case, and then decided that a downward deviation from the 
lodestar was justified.  Pollick argues this downward deviation 
was impermissible because Perdue overruled Hensley’s 
blessing of the Johnson factors, and any post-Perdue reliance 
on the Johnson factors is impermissible, at least as it relates to 
any tinkering with the lodestar.  This is incorrect for at least 
four reasons.  First, Hensley explicitly states that use of the 
Johnson factors is permissible, and Hensley remains binding 
precedent because the Supreme Court has not said otherwise—
its “decisions remain binding precedent until [the justices] see 
fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent cases 
have raised doubts about their continued vitality.”  Bosse v. 
Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016) (per curiam) (quoting Hohn 
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v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53 (1998)).  Second, there 
should be no doubt that Perdue preserved the availability of the 
Johnson factors because the Perdue decision explicitly states 
that “factor[s]” may still justify a deviation from the lodestar.  
559 U.S. at 554.  Third, Perdue, like Hensley, explicitly 
permits consideration of Johnson’s eighth factor—“the results 
obtained.”  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.  And fourth, the Perdue 
Court’s concerns were related to a poorly reasoned upward 
deviation from the lodestar, not a well-reasoned downward 
deviation, as was the case here.  The Perdue district court’s 
untenable fee award was 75% higher than the lodestar and was 
supported by a bare-bones reference to “extraordinary” 
circumstances.  559 U.S. at 548, 557-60.  Here, by comparison, 
the District Court deviated downward and provided ample 
reasoning in a thorough and lengthy opinion.3 
 The District Court applied the right law in its fee 
analysis.  And it did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
the relatively modest damage award justified a reduction in the 
lodestar result.   
 Pollick’s two remaining arguments focus on the 
reasonableness of the District Court’s fee determinations, and 
both arguments fall within the abuse-of-discretion standard of 
review.  First, she argues the District Court should have 
accepted her proposed $400-per-hour rate instead of the $250-
per-hour rate the Court picked because the County proffered 
no evidence to contradict her proposed rate.  That is not true—
the County did offer evidence.  It presented an attorney’s 
affidavit stating that attorneys of similar stature in the region 
                                              
 3 We also note that we rejected the same argument about 
Perdue and Johnson that Attorney Pollick made in Dee v. 
Borough of Dunmore, 548 F. App’x 58, 64-65 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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were compensated at rates of $260 and $275 per hour, not far 
from the $250-per-hour rate the court used.  (App. 143.)  
Second, Pollick argues she deserves relief because she made 
out at least a prima facie case supporting her suggested fee rate, 
contrary to the District Court’s holding.  This argument fails, 
however, because Pollick has not shown that she was 
prejudiced by the Court’s decision on that issue:  she still 
received a hearing and was permitted to present evidence, and 
the Court recorded its reasoning in a long and thorough 
opinion.  A prima-facie holding in her favor would have 
substantively altered neither that process nor the outcome.  We 
discern no abuse of discretion by the adoption of an hourly rate 
of $250.   
IV. 
 The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to create 
a jury question as to whether the County’s FLSA violations 
were made willfully, and the District Court’s attorney’s-fee 
standards were correct and applied without abuse of discretion.  
We will affirm. 
